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Abstract 
We look at the exchange rate policy choices and outcomes for small rich economies. Small rich 
economies face significant policy challenges due to proportionately greater economic volatility than 
larger economies. These economies usually choose some form of fixed exchange rate regime, particularly 
in the very small economies where the per capita cost of independent monetary policy is relatively high. 
When such countries do choose a free or managed floating regime, they appear to derive no benefit from 
those regimes; their exchange rate volatility seems to rise without any significant change in fundamental 
economic volatility. Thus, for these countries, floating exchange rates seem to create problems for policy 
makers without solving any. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last few years both positive and negative aspects of small economies have come into prominence. 
Prior to the recent financial crisis, small economies were widely lauded as more successful, flexible and 
entrepreneurial than larger ones. However, the crisis brought many of these small countries, such as 
Iceland and the Baltic countries (especially Latvia), into the headlines as suffering more extreme 
economic hardship. In fact, the experience of small economies both before and during the crisis highlights 
that their economic advantages (in terms of openness and social cohesion) may be offset by the 
disadvantage of high exposure to external shocks and the accompanying macroeconomic volatility. It is 
natural that small countries should be more volatile, since their openness tends to encourage a high degree 
of specialization. Their lack of regional diversification contributes to volatility, as does the fact that 
smaller countries may be less able to bear the fixed costs associated with organizing and regulating 
efficient capital markets that typically provide intertemporal insurance. 
In this paper we ask the question “What kind of monetary policy in general and exchange rate 
policy in particular suits small economies?” In particular, we are interested in whether freely floating 
exchange rates provide insulation from external shocks for small countries. The answer is not obvious; 
while a floating exchange rate can in principle be a buffer against foreign shocks, it may also act as an 
intrinsic source of shocks itself. We attempt to answer this question by looking at the historical 
experience of the small rich economies, and examining their economic performance under different 
currency regimes.  
We find that small countries mostly choose tightly managed exchange rate regimes (mainly in the 
form of currency unions and currency boards). We investigate the reasons for this, but are unable to shed 
much light on the differences between countries that choose to fix their exchange rates and those that 
adopt more flexible regimes. However, the motivation for small countries choosing to fix is borne out by 
our empirical analysis, since we find little relationship between fundamental macroeconomic volatility 3
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and exchange rate volatility. That is, countries with tightly pegged exchange rates seem to benefit from 
more stable exchange rates without any significant difference in underlying macroeconomic volatility. So 
for these economies, a floating exchange rate appears to generate exchange rate volatility without any 
obvious benefit to the economy. In this sense, tightly fixed exchange rate regimes appear to be something 
of a free lunch; they deliver lower exchange rate volatility without any obvious negative consequence. 
In this paper we are particularly interested in the Icelandic experience. Iceland is a very small and 
rich economy with strong institutions and a long history of having its own currency that has been 
managed with a different degree of flexibility, most lately almost freely floating in the run up to the recent 
financial crisis where it experienced a very serious banking and currency crisis. The Icelandic case 
therefore provides an interesting case study for our analysis. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1 Data Sample 
We choose our sample based on two criteria; population and income per head. We include only countries 
with a population between 30,000 and 3,000,000, as well as real GDP per capita above $11,500 (both 
measured using 2007 data, the latter based on PPP exchange rates). The size criterion is a little larger than 
is usually applied to studies of small countries, but is by no means extreme. Most comparable studies 
focus on countries with populations up to 1.5 or 2 million people, though Kuznets’ famous study included 
countries with populations up to 10 million (Kuznets, 1960). Our choice of sample ensures that country 
size is at most an order of magnitude away from Iceland’s population of about 309,000. According to the 
CIA’s “World Factbook” data-set, at the time of this writing (December 2010), the largest of the 
countries/territories in our sample is Oman, with a population of almost 3 million people, just under ten 
times Iceland’s population, while the smallest country is San Marino (31,500) just over a tenth of 
Iceland’s.   4
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We also restrict ourselves to countries that are relevant for Iceland vis-à-vis income; in practice, 
our income criterion closely coincides with the World Bank’s definition of high income. Unsurprisingly, 
the CIA data set indicates that our countries also bracket Iceland in terms of real income;  annual GDP per 
capita for members of our sample range from Lichtenstein’s $122,000, through Iceland’s $40,000, down 
to Grenada’s $11,000. Finally, total annual real GDP varies within our sample from a high of Qatar ($101 
billion) which is somewhat less than an order of magnitude larger than Iceland’s $12 billion; the low end 
is St. Kitts and Nevis ($750 million), just over an order of magnitude smaller. We end up with a set of 
thirty-seven countries and territories; the names are tabulated in Table 1. It is also worth noting that there 
are a range of specializations in the sample (oil exporters, financial centers, and countries focused on 
tourism). 
We gather an annual data set for this set of countries. A higher frequency data set would be 
preferable in some respects, but would limit the cross-country dimension considerably, since many of our 
smaller countries do not collect quarterly observations on the national accounts and other variables of 
interest to us. We begin our sample in 1970, shortly before the start of the “modern era” of exchange rate 
regimes that follows the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. We collect data, where available, through 
2008 (leaving us with thirty-nine annual observations for each country in most cases).   
The data used in this study come from International Financial Institutions namely the UN, IMF 
and World Bank. In most cases (e.g., end-of-period exchange rates, real and nominal GDP, interest rates, 
consumer prices, and money) this means the UN National Accounts data base, International Financial 
Statistics, and World Development Indicators. Other sources are described below. There are, inevitably, a 
number of gaps in the series, though these are generally for highly dependent economies (data for Jersey, 
Guernsey and Isle of Man for example are rarely available). 
2.2 Comparison of Small and Large Economies 5
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Small economies have been widely studied in the literature on economic development, though little work 
has been done on the specific area of the monetary policy and exchange rate challenges they face. 
Generally, the literature on small economies highlights two major problems associated with their size. 
First, indivisibilities and fixed costs in the provision of public services may lead to increasing returns to 
scale which small countries cannot exploit. In the case of monetary policy, it seems reasonable to believe 
that the formulation and implementation of monetary and exchange rate policy requires a minimum scale 
which makes the per capita cost of this service more onerous in smaller economies. Second, economies of 
scale in the private sector may cause small economies to become specialized, which increases their 
dependence on international trade in general and a small range of export industries in particular. This 
combination of openness and specialization is likely to result in a greater exposure to substantial terms of 
trade shocks, resulting in fundamental economic volatility. Indeed, Furceri and Karras (2007) have clearly 
shown that size has a large negative effect on economic volatility. Set against these disadvantages, small 
countries may benefit from less tangible advantages such as greater social cohesion (though, as Easterly 
and Kraay (1999) point out their ethno linguistic diversity is similar to larger countries). They may also be 
able to use international financial markets to diversify their output risk, resulting in lower consumption 
volatility. Appendix 1 discusses these issues more thoroughly. 
In order to assess the scale of these effects for our sample of small rich countries, Table 2 
compares the average characteristics of our small countries with all other economies that meet our GDP 
per capita criteria (i.e. countries with in income per capita above $11,500 and a population above 3 
million in 2007).
1 We compare country characteristics over the period 1970-2008 (e.g. average growth, 
standard deviation of growth, etc.) using data from the World Bank Development Indicator Database 
(except government effectiveness which comes from the World Bank’s Governance dataset and export 
concentration which is UNCTAD data). It shows that our sample of small economies seem to display 
most of the characteristics predicted above. They are significantly more open than large economies, are 
more highly specialized in terms of export industries and display greater terms of trade and output 6
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volatility.
2 We also find some evidence of small country effects in the provision of public services 
through a larger average share of government consumption and a lower perceived level of government 
effectiveness for small countries. However neither of these indicators is significantly different between 
the two groups. 
We find mixed evidence on risk diversification. Firstly, we find that that growth in small 
countries has lower correlation with world growth than that of large, but the covariance is very similar. 
This indicates that the higher macroeconomic volatility of small economies is related to idiosyncratic 
shocks rather than a greater exposure to the global business cycle and thus, in principle, should be 
relatively easy to diversify away. Secondly, the fact that the average absolute current account (i.e. the 
average scale of current account surpluses and deficits) is very much higher for small countries – even 
larger than might be expected given their openness – is indicative of extensive use of international 
borrowing and lending – presumably to help smooth shocks. However, when we look at the volatility of 
consumption, we find that it is higher for small countries and is roughly the same as their output volatility 
(whereas for large countries consumption volatility is lower than output volatility). This is prima face
evidence against small countries using global financial markets to smooth out output shocks and suggests 
that their extensive use of international financial markets is for some other purpose. 
Finally, we find that despite the disadvantages outlined above, small economies generally enjoy 
more rapid growth and lower inflation than their larger cousins – though the inflation difference is due to 
a few outliers in the large country group and so is not statistically significant and cannot be much read 
into. The higher average growth seems consistent with the idea that small countries benefit from 
intangible advantages – such as greater social cohesion – that offset their disadvantages.  
3. Exchange Rate Regime Choice 7
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Having outlined our sample of countries and their key characteristics, we now move on to look at their 
choice of exchange rate regime and the impact of that choice. Our first step is to outline how exchange 
rate regimes are classified. Our preference here is to use de facto measures of regimes rather than de jure
classifications. 
3.1 Exchange Rate Regime Data 
We take this from two different sources. First, we use the classification scheme developed by Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) – abbreviated to LYS below. They combine data on exchange rates and 
international reserves using cluster analysis; that way they can account for foreign exchange market 
intervention as well as exchange rate movements. They end up with a classification that splits countries 
into three exchange rate regimes: fixed; intermediate; and floating. Unfortunately their data sample ends 
in 2004 and so we have extended it by hand.
3 To check the sensitivity of our results, we also use the 
method developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) – abbreviated to RR below. These authors rely on the 
movements of market-determined exchange rates. Black market exchange rates often diverge from 
official ones when there are parallel or dual markets because of capital controls. At this stage, we use the 
“coarse” classification provided, which divides the data set into five bins: fixed exchange rates (including 
those in currency unions or boards); narrow crawling pegs; wide pegs/managed float; floating; and “freely 
falling” countries with high inflation. In practice, the floating and falling categories appear rarely in our 
data set so we merge these into the wide pegs/managed float classification leaving us with three bins as in 
LYS. The RR data set has been updated through 2008.
4 Both methods classify nominal exchange rate 
regimes. 
For both classification systems, we find that our thirty-seven countries choose overwhelmingly to 
maintain fixed exchange rate regimes. As the data in Table 3 show, over three-quarters of our sample are 
classified as fixed exchange rate regime observations by both LYS and RR; only 13% of the sample is not 
classified as fixed by either system (i.e. as being classified as intermediate/floating in LYS and 8
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crawling/wide peg in RR). Our sample of small, rich, open economies therefore demonstrates a clear 
preference for tight exchange rate regimes. This is unsurprising; Rose (2010) documents conventional 
wisdom in showing that countries with fewer than around 2.5 million people have disproportionately 
chosen to have fixed rather than floating exchange rate regimes. The economic logic is clear; there are 
fixed costs associated with running a monetary authority, and larger countries find it easier to absorb 
these costs. Smaller countries also trade more than larger ones and may also reap larger trade benefits 
from lower exchange rate volatility, especially in the face of imperfect financial markets which raise the 
cost of hedging foreign exchange risk. More extensive trade could also leave small countries’ inflation 
rates more exposed to exchange rate shocks, leaving them with more volatile inflation rates (cf. Pétursson, 
2010b). 
Figure 1 shows the time series of exchange rate regimes choices for both classifications (both for 
our extended dataset labeled ‘interpolated’ and the underlying raw data). As well as highlighting once 
again the preponderance of fixed regimes in our sample, it also seems to demonstrate the well-known 
phenomenon of ‘the disappearing middle’ whereby for LYS, for example, intermediate currency regimes 
are the only alternative to fixed ones at the beginning of the sample, but at the end of the sample no 
intermediate regimes exist and the floating regimes become the only alternative to fixed ones.   
Iceland’s historic choice of exchange rate regimes stands out as an outlier, at least compared with 
this sample of countries. Iceland is never classified as fixed by RR. LYS classify Iceland as fixed for 
thirteen years between 1987 and 2000, during this period of time, RR assert it as being in a narrow crawl.
5
On both classifications Iceland has fewer years of fixed exchange rates than any other country in our 
sample.
6 Iceland’s closest comparator is Mauritius that has floated for around 10 years since 1970 
according LYS. 
3.2 What determines regime choices? 9
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Although there is a large and generally inconclusive literature on the determinants of currency regime 
choices it is interesting to look at our sample, given the characteristics of small countries discussed above. 
In particular, there are two unusual features of small countries that may have an impact on their regime 
choices. Firstly, indivisibilities in the provision of an independent currency (ranging from currency 
issuance to monetary policy formulation and implementation) may make the cost of currency 
independence more onerous for small countries. Secondly, small countries are often not fully political 
independent or have only been granted independence quite recently. As Imam (2010) has shown, this 
limited or recent political independence may influence exchange rate regime choice.   
To assess the determinants of regime choice, we estimate an ordered-response probit model 
where the dependent variable is currency regime classified as fixed, intermediate and floating (or fixed, 
narrow crawl and managed float/float in the case of the RR). Each regime classification is assigned values 
of one to three, respectively, and then the choice of classification is estimated as a function of standard 
optimal currency area variables and specific small country variables. We include fixed effects for each 
year, but not for each country (as some of our independent variables have no time series variation). 
The independent variables we choose are: 
x Openness. The Optimal Currency Area (OCA) literature predicts that the benefits of a common 
currency are increasing in trade openness. Openness is measured as exports plus imports as a 
share of GDP. 
x A Dominant Trading Partner. Using similar arguments, OCA also predicts that a single dominant 
trading partner increases the benefit of a common currency with that partner. Since our countries 
have/can choose a wide range of currency partners we use the trade share of the largest trading 
partner based on IMF direction of trade data (average import trade shares of the period 1980-
2008). 
x Business Cycle Correlation. Standard OCA theory suggests that an independent currency can 
help a country adjust to asymmetric shocks (though more recent evidence including that 10
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presented below questions this view). Given this, countries exposed to more asymmetric shocks 
may tend to choose an independent currency. We measure this asymmetry as the full sample 
correlation of each country’s output gap with the trade-weighted output gap of its trading partners 
(with trend output estimated using an HP filter, Ȝ = 100). 
x Population. As discussed above, indivisibilities in the provision of public services, such as an 
independent currency, can make then too costly for smaller countries. Thus, the smaller countries 
in our sample may be more likely to choose a common currency. We take the log of population to 
capture this per capita effect.   
x Political independence. Countries with limited political independence may also find themselves 
required to adopt a common currency. We use a dummy variable which equals one if a country is 
not classified as politically independent in the CIA Factbook.   
x Years since independence. Alternatively, since almost all the independent countries in our sample 
have only been granted independence in the last fifty years or so, they may choose an 
independent currency as a way of reinforcing their independence from former colonial masters. If 
this is the case we might expect countries that have been independent for many years to revert to 
a fixed regime. Years since independence are derived from CIA Factbook. 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the determinants of regime choice for our two regime 
classifications. Generally speaking, the results for the standard OCA variables are poor; openness is 
insignificant and of mixed sign for both classifications, trading partner is of the right sign but is 
significant only for the LYS classification and business cycle correlation is also of the right sign but 
significant only for the RR classification.
7 When we move to the three small country variables (population 
and the two measure of political independence), the results are more clear cut, all three are highly 
significant with the right sign so that very small countries tend to choose a common currency as do 
countries with limited political independence or with a long history of political independence. These 
results suggest that the costs of running an independent currency are significant for small countries and 11
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that political considerations are important in currency regime choice. Overall, however, our ability to 
explain regime choice is poor with Psuedo R
2 around the 10% mark in both these regressions. Note that if 
we drop Iceland from the estimation, R
2 improves by about 2% for both specifications, Iceland has many 
attributes that would suggest it should be a fixed regime according to these models.  
4. Currency Regimes and Exchange Rate Volatility 
To some extent the overwhelming tendency for small countries to choose fixed exchange rate regimes is 
indicative of the advantages of such regimes for these countries. In this section we test that proposition 
more directly. Firstly, by undertaking a simple comparison of economic performance under different 
regimes and secondly, by a more formal test of the relationship between economic fundamentals and 
exchange rate volatility under different regimes.  
4.1 Economic Performance in different regimes 
Table 5 shows the average economic performance of our sample of countries under each regime. Starting 
with the simple growth and inflation comparisons, it is clear that both average growth and growth 
volatility is very similar across regimes whilst the inflation performance varies significantly with floating 
regimes experiencing far greater average inflation and inflation volatility.
8 Both nominal and real 
effective exchange rates are also significantly more volatile in both intermediate and floating regimes 
(note that since most currency pegs are against a single currency, effective currency volatility can be 
considerable even for fixed regimes). We also look at the relationship between real exchange rate changes 
and the output gap. If exchange rates act as shock absorbers, we might expect a significant negative 
relationship between the real exchange rate and the output gap (i.e. a negative output gap should be 
associated with depreciating real exchange rate). As a simple test of this relationship we undertake a fixed 
effect regression of the real effective exchange rate against the output gap (panel unit root tests indicate 12
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that both series are stationary), where trend output is estimated using an HP filter as above. The results of 
this regression are a little surprising as it indicates that the output gap exchange rate relationship is 
strongest for fixed regimes (for LYS), whilst it is insignificant for intermediate regimes. Even though the 
results are mixed for other regimes, it seems clear that non-fixed exchange rate regimes do not generally 
find that their real exchange rates help offset the business cycle. 
4.2 Exchange Rate Volatility and Fundamentals 
As a floater, there is little doubt that Iceland has experienced higher exchange rate volatility than other 
countries in the sample which have maintained fixed exchange rates. The question of interest is whether 
Iceland has channeled volatility into the exchange rate from some other part of the economy.
9 If 
economies have a certain unavoidable amount of volatility stemming from shocks striking their 
economies, the foreign exchange market may be a good place to send it, since risk there can be more 
easily hedged than on (say) labor or product markets. As Friedman (1953) argued: 
 “ … instability of exchange rates is a symptom of instability in the underlying 
economic structure … a flexible exchange rate need not be an unstable exchange 
rate. If it is, it is primarily because there is underlying instability in the economic 
conditions … ” 
Friedman’s argument is that exchange rate instability is a manifestation of economic volatility. Exchange 
rate regimes differ in the mechanisms through which this underlying volatility is channeled. For instance, 
“money supply” or “liquidity” shocks affect the nominal exchange rate when rates float, but the money 
supply if rates are fixed. Underlying systemic volatility cannot be reduced by the regime, only channeled
to one locus or another. According to this theory, the economy can be thought of as a balloon; squeezing 
volatility out of one part merely transfers the volatility elsewhere. 13
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So in principle, if exchange rate volatility varies by (endogenously-chosen) exchange rate 
regimes, so should macroeconomic volatility. But does this theory actually work in practice? We now 
proceed to see if macroeconomic volatility varies systematically by exchange rate regime. Unfortunately 
for the theory, as we now show there is remarkably little evidence of a systematic relationship between 
the exchange rate regime and measurable macroeconomic phenomena (at least for low- and moderate-
inflation countries at high- and medium-frequencies). In doing so, we actually confirm conventional 
wisdom; a number of researchers have shown formally that the variability of observable macroeconomic 
variables such as money, output, and consumption do not differ systematically across exchange rate 
regimes. 
The vehicle we use to frame our discussion is a completely standard model of the foreign 
exchange market which links the exchange rate to macroeconomic fundamentals. This monetary model 
allows us to explore the trade-off between exchange rate and macroeconomic volatility in a transparent 
fashion.  
We keep the model simple. It consists merely of asset market equilibrium and a purchasing power 
parity (PPP) condition: 
mt – pt= Eyt – Dit + Ht         ( 1 )  
pt = et + p*t + vt          ( 2 )  
where: mt is the domestic stock of money at time t; pt is the price level; yt is real output; it is the interest 
rate (level), et is the domestic price of foreign exchange; D and E are parameters, an asterisk represents a 
foreign variable; all variables (except interest rates) are expressed as natural logarithms, Ht is a shock to 
the money market; and vt is a stationary deviation from PPP. It is important to note that the model is 
structural, so that the parameters and shocks are not policy-dependent.
10
  We assume there is an identical foreign analogue to (1). Subtracting it from (1) and substituting 
into (2), we arrive at: 14

et = (m – m*)t – E(y – y*)t + D(i – i*)t – (H – H*)t – vt     (3) 
which expresses the exchange rate as a function of macroeconomic “fundamentals”, namely differentials 
(differences between domestic and foreign values) of money, output, interest rates and shocks. 
  Equation (3) implies a volatility trade-off. If the exchange rate is fixed, then (Ht or vt) shocks 
translate into volatile money, output or interest rates. If the exchange rate floats cleanly, then the same 
shocks create exchange rate movements.
11 Expressed alternatively, volatility in the exchange rate – the 
left-hand side of (3) – should mirror fundamental macroeconomic volatility of the right-hand side. 
  Unfortunately, our simple macroeconomic model does not capture even the grossest features of 
the data. We focus on one key feature; the volatility of the different sides of equation (3). If the model 
works well, these should be similar. In reality though, exchange rate volatility (the left side) varies 
systematically and dramatically across exchange rate regimes, while observable macroeconomic volatility 
– its counterpart on the right – does not.   
  Measuring the left-hand side of equation (3) is trivial, since exchange rates are among the most 
accurately measured economic data available. The right-hand side is trickier. There are two potentially 
serious complications. The first issue is the unknown parameters. We could directly estimate D and E, but 
choose simply to use plausible values from the literature (unity for both the income elasticity and the 
interest semi-elasticity of money demand). Flood and Rose (1995) show that this result holds for a very 
wide range of reasonable parameter values. 
  The second issue is the unobservable nature of the money market and price disturbances terms. 
Flood and Rose (1995) estimate these directly, and substitute in the estimates. Setting the disturbances to 
their unconditional values (of zero) leads to very similar results, however. The reason is simple; since the 
disturbances are structural, there is little reason why they should differ with the exchange rate regime. For 
the same reason, measurement error of money and output is an unimportant problem. 15
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4.3 Empirics of volatility 
We now compare the volatility of the left- and right-hand sides of equation (3) for a number of different 
countries. We ask “Do countries with volatile exchange rates also have high macroeconomic volatility?” 
This test exploits cross-country evidence from a given period of time, and is thus immune to time-specific
effects, such as oil prices.   
Our evidence is contained in Figure 2, which plots standard deviations of exchange rates (et) on 
the ordinate (y-axis) against macroeconomic fundamentals [(m – m*)t – (y – y*)t + (i – i*)t] on the 
abscissa (x-axis). We do this for the (twenty-two) countries of our sample with complete data. There are 
four panels in Figure 2. Where the top row uses effective exchange rates, the row below it is the analogue 
computed using bilateral (dollar) rates and accordingly compares domestic and US fundamentals. The 
graphs on the left use M1 as the measure of the money stock, while the graphs on the right use M2 
instead. 
Figure 2 shows clearly that there are enormous differences in exchange rate volatility across 
countries. But these differences are essentially unrelated to those in macroeconomic fundamentals. Both 
stable and unstable exchange rates are consistent with similar macroeconomic volatility. The regression 
line for the cross-country relationship between exchange rate and fundamental volatility is included in the 
graphs, along with a ± 2SE confidence interval. While the slopes are all positive, none is significantly 
different from zero at conventional statistical levels. It is also interesting to note that Iceland is an outlier 
in all four cases; it has the highest degree of nominal exchange rate volatility in all four graphs. Using M1 
as the money measure, Iceland has mid-sample fundamental volatility, though Iceland’s fundamental 
volatility is at the top end of the sample when we use M2 to measure money.
1216
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Correlation is of course not causation. But the point is that here there’s almost no correlation: 
countries that float tend to have systematically higher exchange rate volatility but barely distinguishable 
fundamental volatility to those that choose fixed exchange rate regimes.   
As a more formal test of the relationship between exchange rate and fundamental volatility across 
regimes, Table 6 compares the standard deviation of fundamentals across different exchange rate regimes 
with the volatility of exchange rate based measures. Monetary fundamentals are calculated for both M1 
and M2 and all measures are calculated on a trade-weighted and dollar basis. It shows that exchange rate 
volatility varies significantly across regimes and although fundamental volatility also rises from fixed to 
floating regimes (significantly so for the RR classification) the rise in fundamental volatility is 
considerably smaller than the increase in exchange rate volatility across regimes.  
4.4 Interpretation 
Our finding is grossly inconsistent with the spirit of Mundell’s Incompatible Trinity or trilemma, since 
small open economies seem to be able to experience lower exchange rate volatility without any visible 
cost in terms of macroeconomic volatility (which might be expected if monetary autonomy is 
compromised).   
That said, our finding is quite consistent with the literature. Mussa (1986) established 
convincingly that nominal and real exchange rate variability changes substantially and systematically with 
the exchange rate regime. Mussa used bilateral dollar exchange rates for a variety of industrial countries 
from 1957-84 to show that the variance of real exchange rates is an order of magnitude greater in the 
floating period after the Bretton Woods period than it was during the Bretton Woods regime of pegged 
rates.
13 In his published comment on Mussa, Fisher Black argued that “empirical workers in the field of 
exchange rates will not regard this as new information” and cites work which precedes Mussa’s.
14
Mussa’s evidence is especially convincing to us for two reasons. First, it is undisputed, at least to our 17
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knowledge. Second, the objective of Mussa’s paper is unrelated to ours; he was interested in rejecting 
models which do not incorporate price sluggishness, since the latter embody the property of nominal 
exchange regime neutrality. 
Baxter and Stockman (1989) extended Mussa’s work on exchange rates to other macroeconomic 
variables. Using data for a variety of both OECD and developing countries, Baxter and Stockman 
examine the variability of output, trade variables, and both private and government consumption, using 
different de-trending techniques. They find they are 
“unable to find evidence that the cyclic behavior of real macroeconomic 
aggregates depends systematically on the exchange-rate regime. The only 
exception is the well-known case of the real exchange rate.” 
Flood and Rose (1995) performed similar cross-country volatility analysis with nominal effective
exchange rates, money, output, interest rates, inflation and stock markets and found comparable results. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) refer to this stylized fact as being part of their sixth “Exchange Rate 
Disconnect” puzzle. Recent empirical papers, such as Artis and Ehrmann (2006) and Farrant and 
Peersman (2006), also reach similar conclusions. Using a structural VAR analysis, they find that a 
significant share of nominal and real exchange rate fluctuations is explained by shocks originating in the 
foreign exchange market itself, which they attribute to movements in a currency risk premium. So we 
think that our findings are consistent with long-established stylized facts. 
Theoretical models to rationalize the stylized fact (of exchange rate volatility that varies by 
regime in the face of similar fundamental macroeconomic volatility) are provided by Flood and Rose 
(1999) and Jeanne and Rose (2002). Flood and Rose (1999) emphasize the existence of non-linearity and 
multiple equilibria, while Jeanne and Rose (2002) introduce noise traders into the foreign exchange 
market that can generate high exchange rate volatility that is unrelated to economic fundamentals.
15 The 
Flood and Rose model is described briefly in Appendix 2. 18
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5. What type of fixed regime? 
So far our analysis has focused on the broad regime choices, largely between fixed, intermediate and 
floating. We have found that fixed regimes appear to have the key advantage of removing a source of 
extraneous volatility (exchange rate volatility) and that this result seems consistent with the de facto
choice of regime by the small countries we analyze since the overwhelming majority have opted for some 
form of fixed regime.  
In this section we look in more detail at the type of fixed regime that countries choose. To do this 
we utilize the fine grid exchange rate classification produced by Reinhart and Rogoff. This classification 
has 14 categories ranging from freely falling to no separate legal tender, and whilst the classifications of 
non-fixed regimes are far too numerous for our purposes (recall that only 14% of our sample contains 
non-fixed regimes on the LYS classification), the subset of fixed regimes is informative. Thus, in this 
section we break up our coarse grid category of fixed regimes into three sub categories based on the fine 
grid, namely: 1) No separate legal tender; 2) Pre-announced peg or currency board; 3) narrow band or de 
facto peg (which combines the two categories from RR; pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower 
than or equal to ± 2% and de facto peg). As well as analyzing these sub-categories of the RR 
classification, we also use the fine grid classification to split the LYS classification of fixed regimes into 
the same three sub-categories. In a few cases this means identifying the appropriate sub-category for 
regimes that are classified as fixed by LYS but not RR. We do this by reference to the de jure regime 
classification (i.e. the publically announced regime) since these are relatively accurate in the case of fixed 
regime classifications 1 and 2 (and so category 3 can be inferred). Table 7 shows the distribution of sub-
categories of fixed regimes. 
5.1 What determines the choice of fixed regime? 19

Table 8 repeats the regime choice regression described above but focuses purely on the choice of fixed 
regime type. The most remarkable aspect of this table is the similarity of the results with those of Table 4 
that looked at the determinants of overall regime choice. As in Table 4 most of the OCA variables work 
poorly, with the exception of business cycle correlation which predicts a greater likelihood of stricter 
fixed regimes, the more correlated the domestic business cycle is with its global counterpart (though it is 
possible that more fixed regimes such as currency unions encourage greater business cycle correlation). 
Small economy and political independence variables all work well, with smaller countries more likely to 
choose the stricter fixed regimes, and countries that are either not independent or have been independent a 
long time more likely to choose the stricter regimes. In fact, the R
2of these regressions are around the 
25% mark - far better than the broader regime choice equations. 
5.2 Economic outcomes for fixed regimes 
Table 9 examines economic performance by fixed regime and finds that currency unions have 
significantly lower volatility of growth, inflation and the real effective exchange rate than the other fixed 
regimes but significantly lower growth. The lower growth can probably be explained through “the iron 
law of convergence” (where poorer countries tend to catch-up with richer ones) since currency unions 
tend to have significantly higher GDP per capita than the other regimes.  Interestingly, despite lower real 
exchange rate volatility, currency unions tend to have a strong tendency for the real exchange rate to 
depreciate when the output gap is negative. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, no small country 
currency union has been abandoned over our sample whilst other fixed regimes have a significant 
tendency to be ended (mainly through currency crisis or progression to a stricter fixed regime). In 
particular, de facto pegs/narrow bands have a probability of exit of more than 10% per annum over our 
sample, indicating that these regimes are surprisingly transient.     20

5. Conclusion 
Although rich small economies are generally highly successful, their acute exposure to external shocks 
makes monetary and exchange rate policy problematic, and these problems are compounded by the 
relatively high per capita cost of creating institutions to combat them. In this paper we not only find that 
the most common response of small countries is to adopt a strictly fixed exchange rate regime such as 
joining a currency union or adopting a currency board, but we also demonstrate that this choice makes 
sense given the fact a freely floating exchange rate tends to result in greater exchange rate volatility 
without any corresponding impact on underlying macroeconomic volatility. In fact, given our results it is 
something of a puzzle why small rich countries ever choose to operate with a free float except perhaps for 
non-economic reasons such as reinforcing political independence. Additionally, our results on types of 
fixed regimes suggest that currency unions and, to a lesser extent, currency board type arrangements have 
significant advantages over less strict fixed regime. In particular, we find that currency unions are longed-
lived whilst less strict fixed regimes, such as narrow bands or de facto pegs, are surprisingly transient. 
Thus, in the case of Iceland, our results suggest that a strict peg, such as a membership in a 
currency union or a currency board arrangement, will lead to a more stable exchange rate without adding 
to macroeconomic fluctuations. We therefore find limited empirical evidence supporting the commonly 
cited argument that the current flexible exchange rate arrangement facilitates economic adjustment to 
shocks and thus reduces real economic volatility. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that a fixed currency regime is by no means a panacea 
for small countries; they still face significantly more macroeconomic volatility than their larger cousins, 
irrespective of exchange rate regime. This suggests that these countries should consider other means of 
managing these shocks such as forms of international risk sharing (though, as Iceland’s recent experience 
suggests, openness to international financial markets need not in itself lead to improved risk sharing) and 
aggressively counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Perhaps these countries need even to consider more innovative 21

solutions to the problem of volatility such as sovereign debt with state-contingent payouts and counter-
cyclical resource exploitation.    22

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Table 1: List of Countries and Territories in Sample 
Andorra Antigua Aruba  Bahamas 
Bahrain Barbados  Bermuda  Brunei 
Caymans Cyprus  Equatorial  Guinea  Estonia 
Faroe Islands  French Polynesia Greenland  Grenada 
Guam  Guernsey  Iceland  Isle of Man 
Jersey Latvia Liechtenstein  Luxembourg 
Macau Malta  Mauritius  Netherlands  Antilles 
New Caledonia  Oman  Qatar  San Marino 
Seychelles  Slovenia  St. Kitts & Nevis  St. Lucia 
Trinidad & Tobago       
Table 2: Comparing Small and Large Rich Economies 
   Large  Small 
Openness  Merchandise Exports+Imports (% of GDP)  70.2  110.5** 
Export 
Concentration 
Herfindahl Index of Export Industries (index 
value) 
0.18 0.40** 
Economic Volatility  Standard Deviation of Terms of Trade   5.8  9.2* 
Standard Deviation of GDP growth  3.7  5.7** 
Standard Deviation of consumption growth  3.1  5.7** 
Government Scale  Government Consumption (% of GDP)  17.7  19.0 
Government Effectiveness (index value)  1.07  0.77 
Risk Sharing  Absolute Current Balance (% of GDP)  4.7  14.0** 
Growth Correlation with World Growth  0.46  0.30** 
Growth Covariance with World Growth  1.76  1.74 
Economic 
Performance 
Average Growth  3.5  4.5* 
Average Inflation  18.7  6.5
Income  GDP per capita (2008 $ PPP)  31,000  35,000 
Average across countries of time series average using annual World Bank WDI data for the period 1970-
2008 (where available) except government effectiveness which is the country average of World Bank 
estimate for 2008 (based on survey data, see Kaufmann, Kray, Mastruzzi, 2009) and export concentration 
which is based on UNCTAD data (three-digit SITC, Revision 2 level) average of 1995-2007. Asterisks 
indicate that the difference between small and large country samples is significant at the 5% level (one 
asterisk) or 1% level (two asterisks) based on Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. All figures are percentages 
unless otherwise noted. 
Table 3: Exchange Rate Regimes: Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger vs. Reinhart & Rogoff 





LYS Fix  986 7  93  1,086 
LYS Intermediate  16 38 76  130 
LYS Floating  1  21 24 46 
LYS Total  1,003 66  193  1,262 26

Table 4: Determinants of Currency Regime Choice  
Independent variables LYS regime classification  RR regime classification 
Openness (exports +imports as 































Each column is a separate ordered probit estimation with exchange rate regime as dependent variable (1 = 
fix; 2 = intermediate/narrow crawl; 3 = float/others). Period fixed effects are included but not reported. 
Standard errors are in parentheses; coefficients significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level are 
marked with one (two) asterisk(s). Coefficient and standard errors for years since independence are 
multiplied by 100. 
Table 5: Macroeconomic performance by Currency Regime 
  LYS classification  RR classification 
fixed   intermediate  Float  fixed   intermediate  Other 
Average  growth  4.1% 4.7% 3.6% 4.2% 4.3% 4.1% 
Growth  volatility  5.3% 5.9% 3.9% 5.4% 5.3% 4.4% 
Average  inflation    6.0% 8.3%**  15.3%**  5.7% 6.5%**  10.2%** 
Inflation 
volatility 
6.7%  11.5%** 14.2%** 5.7%  5.5%**  14.3%** 
EER  volatility 5.5%  15.0%** 23.0%** 6.1%  8.5%**  16.5%** 
REER  volatility  6.9% 9.3%**  18%**  6.7% 8.0%**  12.8%** 
REER/output gap 
coefficient 
-2.6%†† 0.0%  -0.4%  -0.5%†† 0.0%  -8.0%†† 
GDP  per  capita  36700 28300**  27300**  36000 34500 28000** 
The table compares average annual growth and inflation and standard deviation of growth, inflation, 
change in nominal effective exchange rate (EER) and change in real effective exchange rate (REER) 
under different currency regimes. *,** indicates that the difference between figure with asterisk and 
figure for fixed regime is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, based on 
Satterthwaite Welch t-test for means and F-test for variances. REER/Output gap coefficient shows 
estimated coefficient of fixed effect regression of REER on the output gap, †† indicates that coefficient is 
significant at the 1% level. 27

Table 6: Volatility of Exchange Rates and Fundamentals  
LYS classification  RR classification 


















fixed   Trade-
weighted 
basis
 0.06  0.16   0.12   0.06  0.16   0.12 
intermediate    0.12**  0.17   0.14   0.09  0.15   0.11 
floating    0.18**  0.17   0.14   0.15**  0.20**   0.17** 
fixed   Dollar 
basis
 0.05  0.16   0.12   0.06  0.16   0.11 
Intermediate   0.14**  0.17   0.13   0.08**  0.14   0.11 
floating    0.16**  0.19   0.14   0.16**  0.22**   0.18** 
Estimates of the standard deviation of fundamentals and exchange rates by regime where both exchange 
rates and fundamentals are estimated on a trade-weighted and bilateral dollar basis. *,** indicates 
difference between figure with asterisk and figure for fixed regime is statistically significant at the 1% 
and 5% level respectively based on F-Test of variance. 
Table 7: Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes: Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger vs. Reinhart & Rogoff 
  Currency Union  Pre-announced peg or 
currency board 
Pre-announced 
Narrow Band or de
facto peg
RR 209 655  71 
LYS 248 740  86 
Table 8: Determinants of Fixed Currency Regime Choice  
Independent variables  LYS regime classification  RR regime classification 
Openness (exports +imports as 































Each column is a separate ordered probit estimation with exchange rate regime as dependent variable (1 = 
currency union; 2 = currency board/pre-announced peg; 3 = pre-announced narrow band/ de facto peg).
Period fixed effects are included but not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses; coefficients 
significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level are marked with one (two) asterisk(s). Coefficient 
and standard errors for years since independence are multiplied by 100. 28
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Table 9: Macroeconomic performance by Fixed Currency Regime 













Average  growth  3.2% 4.4%**  4.2%*  3.2% 4.4%**  4.5%** 
Growth  volatility  3.2% 5.8%**  3.7% 3.2% 5.8%**  3.1% 
Average  inflation    6.2% 5.5% 6.8% 6.0% 5.6% 5.0% 
Inflation 
volatility 
5.2% 6.4%**  6.8%**  5.1% 5.9%**  4.7% 
REER  volatility  4.8% 7.2%**  6.5%**  3.8% 7.3%**  5.9%** 
REER/output gap 
coefficient 
-1.3%†† -0.1%†  -0.4%†  -1.3%†† -0.1%†  -0.4%† 
Probability of 
Exit (per year) 
0.0% 3.0%**  10.5%**  0.0% 3.2%**  12.7%** 
GDP  per  capita  55200 30000**  45600*  64500 28600**  46400** 
Table compares average annual growth and inflation and standard deviation of growth, inflation, change, 
change in real effective exchange rate (REER), probability of exit (i.e. number of regimes exits divided 
by number of years regime is observed) and GDP per capita under different currency regimes. *,** 
indicates that the difference between figure with asterisk and figure for Currency union is statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively based on Satterthwaite Welch t-test for means and F-test 
for variances. REER/Output gap coefficient shows estimated coefficient of fixed effect regression of 
REER on the output gap, †† indicates that coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
Further Information on Data Sources 
x GDP, Inflation, M1, M2, Population, Exports and Imports: UN Data cross-referenced with World 
Development Indicators and International Financial Statistics. (though note that small vs. large 
country comparison based on world development indicators only). 
x Exchange Rates: International Financial Statistics.
x Trade weights (for EER, REER etc.): Average import shares (1980-2008) from IMF direction of 
trade data (sometimes supplemented with local sources). 
x Exchange rate volatility: Standard deviation of monthly exchange rate changes. 
x GDP and Inflation growth and volatility: Annual growth and standard deviation.  
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Cross-Sectional Regression with +/- 2se CI shown.  Equatorial Guinea dropped as outlier.
Standard Deviations of Annual Growth Rates, 1971-2008 for 22 Countries
Volatility: Exchange Rates Against Fundamentals
Figure 2: Cross-Country Volatility of Exchange Rates and Fundamentals 31
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 Appendix 1: Why Might Country Size Matter? 
Numerous theorists have discussed the effects of national size, especially in recent economics and not-so-
recent political philosophy. Much recent economics focuses on “scale effects”, so that larger countries 
should be more successful countries. At the other extreme, a number of celebrated political philosophers 
argue that smaller countries make better states. There is also a strand of reasoning that articulates a 
tradeoff between the benefits and costs of size. We now review these briefly; the objective is simply to 
point out that size matters in a number of different literatures. 
Bigger is Better. Size has an effect on output in a number of different recent literatures of interest 
in economics. Increasing returns remain an intrinsic part of the “new wave” trade theory that began in the 
1980s, and lead to offshoots in economic geography and urban economics. Agglomeration effects are also 
an important element of endogenous macroeconomic growth. Finally, they are part of the political 
economy literature that focuses on the provision of public goods. There is also a long tradition in political 
philosophy arguing that size is positively disadvantageous. 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) analyze the impact of increasing returns on trade, and discuss 
economies of scale both internal and external to the firm. The former can be due to plant-runs or dynamic 
scale economies; while the latter can be due to an effect of scale on the variety of intermediate inputs, 
effects on market structure, or information spillovers. When there are increasing returns to scale and 
transportation costs, countries also exert a “home market effect” (Krugman, 1980). Agglomeration effects 
are also used in modeling urban dynamics as part of the new economic geography (e.g., Fujita, Krugman, 
and Venables, 1999). Indeed, the importance of numerous “border” effects is consistent with the fact that 
a number of economic relations are more efficient within a single country than in separate countries 
(Drazen, 2000). 
  The literature on scale effects in macroeconomics stretches back a long way to Adam Smith’s 
idea that the specialization of labor is limited by the extent of the market. Robinson (1960) lists a number 
of reasons why there might be scale effects across countries, including: enhanced intra-national 
integration (of capital, goods, and especially labor and services markets); higher productivity due to 32

enhanced specialization or longer production runs; a scale effect on competition; and greater ability to 
respond flexibly to technological progress. 
  Much recent work in growth theory has formalized such scale effects. Many models rely on 
learning by doing and/or knowledge spillovers, and result in the conclusion that larger countries should 
grow faster: e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Indeed, scale effects are generic to endogenous growth 
models (Aghion and Howitt, 1998 p 28). Jones (1999, p 143) discusses three classes of endogenous 
growth models and shows that they all have a scale effect: “the size of the economy affects either the 
long-run growth rate or the long-run level of per capita income” since larger countries can support more 
research which delivers a higher level or growth rate of productivity. Ventura (2005, p 92) refers to “the 
standard idea that economic growth in the world economy is determined by a tension between 
diminishing returns and market size effects to capital accumulation.”   
The most authoritative work of relevance in public economics is the recent book by Alesina and 
Spolaore (2003), hereafter AS. They list (pp 3-4) five benefits of large population size: 1) lower per-
capita costs of public goods (monetary and financial institutions, judicial system, communication 
infrastructure, police and crime prevention, public health, etc) and more efficient tax systems; 2) cheaper 
per-capita defense and military costs; 3) greater productivity due to specialization (though access to 
international markets may reduce this effect); 4) greater ability to provide regional insurance; and 5) 
greater ability to redistribute income within the country.   
Tradeoffs Exist. In all this work, larger countries are predicted to be richer or more efficient. 
There is little analysis of the costs of size. AS discuss two costs of larger country size. A minor 
consideration is the potential for administrative and/or congestion costs. The only real issue of importance 
is that larger countries have more diverse preferences, cultures, and languages. The AS hypothesis (p 6) is 
that “on balance, heterogeneity of preferences tends to bring about political and economic costs that are 
traded off against the benefits of size.” This reasoning is not new. In chapter XVII of the Leviathan,
Hobbes argued that small populations were insufficient to deter invasion and provide security, while 
excessively large countries would be incapable of the common defense because of lack of a common 33
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purpose and internal distractions. Olson (1982) argues that small homogenous societies are less burdened 
by the logic of collective action and have more capacity to create prosperity; see also Robinson (1960) 
and Wei (1991). Drazen (2000) provides an excellent critique, and emphasizes (among other things) that 
public goods can be supplied by clubs instead of countries. 
Small is Beautiful. In arguing that size has its costs, AS join a long tradition of political 
philosophers, many of whom believe that small is beautiful. Plato quantified the optimal size of a city-
state at 5,040 households.
16 Similarly in Politics, Aristotle argued that a country should be small enough 
for the citizens to know (and hear!) each other; the entire territory should be small enough to be surveyed 
from a hill. More recently, Rousseau stated:  
“Large populations, vast territories! There you have the first and foremost reason for the 
misfortunes of mankind, above all the countless calamities that weaken and destroy polite 
peoples. Almost all small states, republics and monarchies alike, prosper, simply because 
they are small, because all their citizens know each other and keep an eye on each other, 
and because their rulers can see for themselves the harm that is being done and the good 
that is theirs to do and can look on as their orders are being executed. Not so the large 
nations: they stagger under the weight of their own numbers, and their peoples lead a 
miserable existence – either, like yourselves, in conditions of anarchy, or under petty 
tyrants that the requirements of hierarchy oblige their kings to set over them.”
17
This line of reasoning stretches all the way to at least Myrdal (1968). 
Montesquieu believed that republican countries were necessarily small in both territory and 
population. His logic was that large countries were necessarily diverse and thus required strong 
governments, resulting in monarchies or even despots (for very large countries). Small countries without 
excessive wealth were the most democratic. He famously wrote: 
“In a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is 
subordinated to various exceptions; it depends on accidents. In a small republic, the 
public good is more strongly felt, better known, and closer to each citizen; abuses are less 
extensive, and consequently less protected.”
18
Interestingly, Montesquieu’s logic was inverted by David Hume (1752), who argued in “Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth” that 34

“in a large government, which is modeled with masterly skill, there is compass and room 
enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the 
first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrate, who 
direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is 
very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measure 
against the public interest.” 




To our knowledge, there has been only almost no work on a national scale effect on the level of economic 
well-being (Drazen, 2000 argues that the reverse is also true), aside from Rose (2006). A number of 
different studies in Robinson (1960) tested for economies of scale and found them to be mostly 
unimportant. They also considered the impact of country size on national patterns of specialization, 
diversification, and competition, usually with a similar lack of success. Furceri and Karras (2007) have 
convincingly shown that size has a large negative effect on business cycle volatility. 
By way of contrast, there has been much work done which searches for a scale effect in economic 
growth. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) are typical of the literature and provide limited evidence of a 
scale effect on growth. Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000, 2005) focus on whether the effect (if any) 
of size on growth is mediated through openness; they find moderately supportive results using a panel of 
data and IV techniques. But most of the focus in AS is on the causes and determination of country size 
rather than its effects. 
Appendix 2: A Sketch of a Theoretical Model of non-fundamental FX volatility
In this appendix, we outline a simple theoretical model that removes the strong linkage between 
fundamental macroeconomic volatility and exchange rate volatility. This is motivated by the absence of 
any strong linkage as shown in Figure 2 and Table 6. 35

  Flood and Rose (1999) developed a non-linear model of the exchange rate which links it to 
expectations about both the future level and volatility of the exchange rate. This non-linearity induces 
multiple equilibria and results in regime- and equilibrium-dependent coefficients; it is important in two 
ways. First, when exchange rate variability disappears, certain shocks (to portfolios) effectively disappear. 
Second, the non-linearity in the models produces the possibility of multiple equilibria. When the 
exchange rate is flexible, the model can produce several perfectly viable equilibria. These equilibria may 
correspond to exchange rate regimes with differing volatility; but movements across these equilibria 
could also produce exchange rate volatility without corresponding changes in fundamentals.   
  A credibly fixed exchange rate has neither volatility nor an expected rate of change. Accordingly, 
the foreign exchange risk premium disappears in the model, and the domestic interest rate is equal to the 
foreign rate. So, one of the equilibria corresponds to a credible stable fixed rate regime. 
The situation is dramatically different when the exchange rate either floats explicitly, or is fixed 
unreliably so that speculative attacks are possible. In this case, expected volatility is non-zero, so that in 
the presence of risk-averse agents, forces other than those from money and goods markets drive the 
foreign exchange market. These shocks enter the risk premium non-linearly; its importance for the 
exchange rate is proportional to perceived exchange-rate variance. The “portfolio-balance” shock has no 
role in determining the balance of payments under reliably fixed rates, but it plays a major exchange rate 
role in a float. Thus, the shift from fixed to flexible rates is an essential shift in market structure. If the 
variance of portfolio balance shocks is large compared to the other disturbances, then the exchange rate 
becomes very much a non-monetary phenomenon. 
This sort of non-monetary approach to the exchange rate is helpful when the money market 
disturbances are small compared to portfolio balance disturbances. Of course, there is no reason why 
portfolio balance shocks need always be large compared to other shocks. For instance during periods of 
high inflation, the money market reasserts itself. If inflationary changes in money, bonds, and domestic 
interest rates are large relative to portfolio shocks, macroeconomic variables will have a lot of explanatory 36
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power. But during ordinary periods of tranquility, nominal variables are relatively stable and so do not 
explain exchange rate changes. The same is true at low frequencies.   
  This model allows one to understand why exchange rate volatility can change across regimes 
without noticeable differences in macroeconomic phenomena. It can handle either pegged or flexible 
interest rates; the monetary authorities can conduct essentially any interest rate policy independent of the 
exchange rate. Since there are no constraints on international capital flows, this model violates Mundell’s 
“Incompatible Trinity” of fixed exchange rates, monetary sovereignty, and capital mobility. As the 
endogenous risk premia can adjust to accommodate monetary policy, the central bank has almost 
complete freedom to manipulate interest rates. When the interest rate is pegged and exchange rates float, 
the portfolio-balance shocks that might otherwise be absorbed by the interest rate are instead shunted off 
into the exchange rate. This can magnify the effects of the “taste disturbances” on exchange rates as 
compared with completely market-responsive interest rates. But the portfolio balance structure is regime-
dependent. When interest and exchange rates are fixed simultaneously, the variance created by portfolio 
balance shocks does not move from the interest rate locus to the exchange rate or the balance of 
payments. It simply disappears. 
Endnotes

1We end up with a control group of 39 large rich economies ranging in population size from Uruguay (3.46 million) to 
USA (301 million) and ranging in income from Costa Rica ($11,833) to United Arab Emirates ($51,342). 
2 It would have been interesting to include data on employment volatility, but data problems prevented this.  
3  To do this, we first identified changes in regime by checking for changes in the behavior of exchange rate and reserves 
data over the extended sample that are large enough to move a country from one cluster to another and then double-
checked these changes with changes in de jure regime and the RR classification. If these latter sources both contradicted 
the initial data assessment, the latter sources were preferred. 
4  We note in passing that other classifications exist as well, e.g., the official IMF classifications and the binary 
classification scheme of Shambaugh (2004). We choose not to use the former since it is based on declared official de jure 
policy rather than actual behavior. The latter is problematic since it is based on the official exchange rate. 
5  During this period of time, the official IMF de jure classification has Iceland as fixed, while Shambaugh’s classification 
has it as “non-pegged.” 
6 Gudmundsson et al. (2000) give a detailed historical account of Iceland‘s exchange rate arrangements. They also analyze 
the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) criteria for Iceland and, while acknowledging the limitation of the OCA criteria, they 
conclude that the analysis mainly points towards a flexible exchange rate arrangement for Iceland. 
7 it is worth noting that we tried a number of alternative specifications of these OCA variables including exports as a share 
of GDP for openness, a Herfindahl index of trading partner concentration for dominant trading partner and GDP growth 
correlation with world GDP growth for correlation. The results were similar with all these variants.  37

 
8 We obtained more or less identical results for consumption as for output. The results are available from the authors at 
request. 
9 Using a signal-extraction approach to identify the non-fundamental part of exchange rate fluctuations, Pétursson (2010a) 
finds that an unusually large share of exchange rate fluctuations in Iceland are not related to economic fundamentals. 
10  Most modern “new open economy” macroeconomic models lead to equations very much like equations (1)-(2). 
11  This straightforward intuition is the heart of Mundell’s “Incompatible Trinity” of fixed exchange rates, domestic 
monetary sovereignty and perfect capital mobility. 
12 Honjo and Hunt (2006) find that Iceland faces unusually unfavorable tradeoff between output and inflation fluctuations 
compared to many other inflation-targeting small open economies. 
13  Mussa’s “first important regularity” is: “The short term variability of real exchange rates is substantially larger when 
the nominal exchange rate between these countries is floating rather than fixed.” 
14  Certainly, Stockman (1983) and Aliber (1976) provide consistent earlier evidence.  See also other references given by 
Black. 
15 Devereux and Engel (2002) add local currency pricing and heterogeneous international distribution of commodities to a 
model of noise traders and show that such a model can generate high exchange rate volatility, that is much larger than the 
volatility in underlying fundamentals and that this high exchange rate volatility has no implications for other 
macroeconomic variables. 
16   It is interesting to note that Plato’s logic was that 5,040 is divisible by all numbers 1 through 10. Indeed, 5,040 is a 




17  Jean Jacques Rousseau in The Government of Poland quoted at 
http://www.brothersjudd.com/blog/archives/010141.html.
18 De l’Esprit des Lois Vol I, Book 8, p 131. 
19  There is also a modern strain of political thought which argues that larger countries are inferior; E. F. Schumacher and 
especially Leopold Kohr (especially in The Breakdown of Nations) are among the more well-known writers. This working paper has been produced by
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